Suddenly, every news website in Israel is reporting PM Netanyahu's press release, criticizing a UNESCO decision allegedly claiming that Rachel's Tomb and the Tomb of the Patriarchs are mosques that have no part in Jewish heritage (The initial citing of the decision appeared in Israel Hayom. Netanyahu's press release is a headline in Haaretz and ynet, if to link just two.) According to the press release "[t]he attempt to detach the people of Israel from its heritage is absurd. If the places where the fathers and mothers of the Jewish nation are buried, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Sarah, Leah and Rachel some 4,000 years ago are not part of the Jewish heritage then what is?"
Of course, a reading of the UNESCO decision itself reveals that it only reaffirms the fact that the two sites "are an integral part of the occupied Palestinian Territories" (here is the full decision). There's nothing there about Muslim or Jewish heritage (not with regards to those two sites, anyway). Just a statement that they are both located in one region and not in another - a simple statement that the Tomb of the Patriarch and Rachel's Tomb are in the West Bank, not in Israel.
But, hey, when everyone involved in this conflict has every interest of making it more religious than it is - who cares about the facts if there's a chance to gain some inflammatory PR instead?
Friday, October 29, 2010
Wednesday, October 27, 2010
Trafic Statistics and Inernational Law
Last weekend a few newspapers in Israel published articles about the notorious Route 443, citing IDF sources who claim that, since the route was reopened to the use of Palestinian cars, in accordance with the Israeli Supreme Court decision, only five Palestinian cars, in average, use it each day (Haaretz in Hebrew, JPost in English). According to the item, sources in the IDF feel frustrated with the fact that 60 million NIS were invested in following the Supreme Court's ruling, mainly in fitting security measures to the mixed use of the route, and they doubt that such an expense was worth the result.
I have to say that, at first, I was pretty surprised by the fact that army officials dare challenging a Supreme Court decision, let alone for its financial cost. The item, that appeared simultaneously in too many media sources to be a reporter's initiative, suggest an IDF criticism directed at the Court for not putting the right price tag on the freedom of movement, or on the free movement itself.
But, putting aside the troubling notion of an army that claims to know better than to Supreme Court how to balance human rights, isn't there a point to the IDF's claims about balancing expenses with results? 60 million NIS is not a small amount, and proportionality has always been a factor in international and constitutional law. Could it be that the Court really should have not issued a decision that forced the government to spend so much in order to protect so few?
I think that the answer is clearly no, for two reasons. First, the fact that only five Palestinians are using Route 443 every day is due, more than anything else, to the restrictions the IDF is imposing on them while trying to get on and off that road, in the form of checkpoints and blockades. If the IDF itself is the force that is preventing more common use of the road, it simply cannot claim that little use is why the Supreme Court's decision is flawed. Moreover, since the main legal justification of the land appropriations involved in making Route 443 into a highway in the first place was its benefit to local Palestinian population, it seems that alongside the IDF's duty to protect Israeli cars on the road it is also obligated to make it usable to Palestinian cars.
Second, not every financial consideration can be relevant when debating human rights. Although balancing expenses with results should always be a consideration in putting legal obligations on governments, it's clear that not every financial expense should influence the courts' deliberations. For instance, when a court needs to decide whether a government has a duty to provide a free service to its citizens (e.g. free education, free access to water, free health care) it's relevant to consider how much such a service would cost to the government (and tax payers) before reaching a decision. The courts should definitely acknowledge the limited resources available for allocation by their orders, and not impose a financial obligation that they find unreasonable. But these financial, utilitarian considerations can only be taken into account when they are intrinsic to the right involved, so much that it is the actual right itself. The right to free education, for instance, is the government's duty to provide educational services free of charge. Since education costs money, the right to free education is, in fact, the government's duty to pay for its citizen's education. Whether or not such a right exists should depend, to an extent, on how much that duty would cost.
Freedom of movement, however, is different. The duty it imposes on the government is the duty to refrain from blocking a citizen or resident's movement. This duty is not expensive. The 60 million put into allowing Palestinians free travel on Route 443 did not pay for the governments efforts in refraining from blocking the road. Rather, it was put into balancing the free movement - the right that the Supreme Court found to be illegally infringed - with other important interests, such as security and protection of others (let alone illegitimate interests of Israeli settlement). In fact, rather than enabling free movement, the amounts spent by the IDF were put into security measures that restrict that right. Without even going into whether these restrictions are legitimate or not - they are clearly not intrinsic to the freedom of movement itself. The cost, then, is not the right the Supreme Court ruled on. Therefore, it cannot be a relevant consideration in deliberating the protection of the right itself.
To put it in different words, if someone in the IDF thinks that 60 million NIS is what it costs to follow the Supreme Court's decision, it is up to the IDF to reconsider the measures it decided on. deciding on human rights should be left to the court.
I have to say that, at first, I was pretty surprised by the fact that army officials dare challenging a Supreme Court decision, let alone for its financial cost. The item, that appeared simultaneously in too many media sources to be a reporter's initiative, suggest an IDF criticism directed at the Court for not putting the right price tag on the freedom of movement, or on the free movement itself.
But, putting aside the troubling notion of an army that claims to know better than to Supreme Court how to balance human rights, isn't there a point to the IDF's claims about balancing expenses with results? 60 million NIS is not a small amount, and proportionality has always been a factor in international and constitutional law. Could it be that the Court really should have not issued a decision that forced the government to spend so much in order to protect so few?
I think that the answer is clearly no, for two reasons. First, the fact that only five Palestinians are using Route 443 every day is due, more than anything else, to the restrictions the IDF is imposing on them while trying to get on and off that road, in the form of checkpoints and blockades. If the IDF itself is the force that is preventing more common use of the road, it simply cannot claim that little use is why the Supreme Court's decision is flawed. Moreover, since the main legal justification of the land appropriations involved in making Route 443 into a highway in the first place was its benefit to local Palestinian population, it seems that alongside the IDF's duty to protect Israeli cars on the road it is also obligated to make it usable to Palestinian cars.
Second, not every financial consideration can be relevant when debating human rights. Although balancing expenses with results should always be a consideration in putting legal obligations on governments, it's clear that not every financial expense should influence the courts' deliberations. For instance, when a court needs to decide whether a government has a duty to provide a free service to its citizens (e.g. free education, free access to water, free health care) it's relevant to consider how much such a service would cost to the government (and tax payers) before reaching a decision. The courts should definitely acknowledge the limited resources available for allocation by their orders, and not impose a financial obligation that they find unreasonable. But these financial, utilitarian considerations can only be taken into account when they are intrinsic to the right involved, so much that it is the actual right itself. The right to free education, for instance, is the government's duty to provide educational services free of charge. Since education costs money, the right to free education is, in fact, the government's duty to pay for its citizen's education. Whether or not such a right exists should depend, to an extent, on how much that duty would cost.
Freedom of movement, however, is different. The duty it imposes on the government is the duty to refrain from blocking a citizen or resident's movement. This duty is not expensive. The 60 million put into allowing Palestinians free travel on Route 443 did not pay for the governments efforts in refraining from blocking the road. Rather, it was put into balancing the free movement - the right that the Supreme Court found to be illegally infringed - with other important interests, such as security and protection of others (let alone illegitimate interests of Israeli settlement). In fact, rather than enabling free movement, the amounts spent by the IDF were put into security measures that restrict that right. Without even going into whether these restrictions are legitimate or not - they are clearly not intrinsic to the freedom of movement itself. The cost, then, is not the right the Supreme Court ruled on. Therefore, it cannot be a relevant consideration in deliberating the protection of the right itself.
To put it in different words, if someone in the IDF thinks that 60 million NIS is what it costs to follow the Supreme Court's decision, it is up to the IDF to reconsider the measures it decided on. deciding on human rights should be left to the court.
Sunday, October 24, 2010
Bloggers for taxing oil drilling in Israel
Appologies to all those who do not read Hebrew.
This is a short note by Ofnan in support of the just campaign to tax oil drilling in Israel. Please join us.
את מי מייצג אופיר אקוניס?
מכתב גלוי ליו"ר ועדת הכלכלה
לכבוד יו"ר ועדת הכלכלה, ח"כ אופיר אקוניס,
בדיון בכנסת על תמלוגי הגז אמרת שתומכי העלאת התמלוגים הם "ארגוני שמאל פונדמנטליטסיים", ושאם יועלו התמלוגים, ישראל תהפוך ל"כלכלה סובייטית שחונקת את המשק", ו"הנפגע העיקרי יהיה האזרח". ציינת גם "איאבק בנושא עד טיפת דמי האחרונה".
אבקש לשאול מספר שאלות:
1. על יוזמי הצעת החוק להעלאת התמלוגים נמנים הח"כים שאמה (ליכוד), אורבך (הבית היהודי), וקנין (ש"ס) ואלדד (האיחוד הלאומי). האם, לטענתך, עמיתך לסיעה, כרמל שאמה, וחבר הכנסת אלדד מהאיחוד הלאומי הם "אנשי שמאל פונדמנטליסטיים"?
2. בארה"ב, בבריטניה, בקנדה ובשאר מדינות המערב, חלקו של הציבור הרחב בהכנסות מהפקת גז גבוה ב-66% בממוצע מזה שבישראל. האם, להערכתו של יו"ר ועדת הכלכלה של הכנסת, ארה"ב ובריטניה הן "כלכלות סובייטיות שחונקות את המשק"?
3. התמלוגים בארץ כה נמוכים, עד שחלקה של נובל אנרג'י לבדה, שהיא רק אחת השותפות בקידוחי הגז, בהכנסות, גבוה מזה של אזרחי ישראל. המס שמשלמת נובל אנרג'י בישראל נמוך יותר מזה שהיא משלמת בכל מקום אחר בעולם. האם, לטעמך, "ציונות" פירושה "להיאבק עד טיפת הדם האחרונה" על כך, שמירב הההכנסות מאוצרות הטבע של ישראל יגיעו לכיסו של תאגיד זר, במקום אל אזרחי ישראל?
4. המדינה העלתה לאחרונה את נטל המס השולי על השכירים מהמעמד הבינוני-גבוה ל-58%. רבים משכירים אלה הם עובדי הייטק, שבניגוד לחברות האנרגיה, לא מנצלים אוצרות טבע ששייכים למדינה, אלא להפך – תורמים מכשרונם ומחריצותם לקדמה ולשגשוג במדינה. יתר על כן: בעוד שאין שום חשש, שתאגידי האנרגיה יעזבו לפתע את הקידוחים מיותמים, גם אם המס יעלה והן ירוויחו, נניח, "רק" 40 מיליארד דולר, במקום 50 מיליארד – והרי אלה הסכומים שבהם מדובר – עובדי ההייטק שבהם מדובר דווקא כן עלולים לעזוב את המדינה – ולמרבה הצער, רבים מהם אף עושים זאת.
האם זוהי השיטה שלך לדאוג ל"אזרח" – לאלץ עובדים מהמעמד הבינוני-גבוה, שגם כך נושאים כעת בעיקר נטל המיסוי במדינה, לשאת על גבם מעתה גם הטבות מס בשווי עשרות מיליארדי דולרים לתאגידים זרים?
5. המומחים המקצועיים שתומכים בהעלאת התמלוגים– וביניהם פרופ' ברק מדינה, ד"ר ברנדה שפר ופרופ' אדרעי – לא קיבלו שום תשלום עבור חוות דעתם.
מאידך, כל חוות הדעת שמתנגדות להעלאת התמלוגים נכתבו תמורת תשלום מחברות האנרגיה. בישיבה שאותה ניהלת נכחו 15 לוביסטים בתשלום של תאגידי האנרגיה, המתנגדות להעלאת התמלוגים. את חברת "דלק" מייצג עו"ד רם כספי, המוכר גם כאבי "שיטת השקשוקה".
מכאן עולה התהיה - האם הלוביסטים ופרקליטי ה"שקשוקה" הם ה"אזרח" שלו אתה דואג כל כך?
בכבוד רב,
בקשה מהקוראים
תזכורת: מאבקים שפעלו בדרכים דומות הביאו לשינוי תקנות הרעש של השר ארדן, להגשת כתבי אישום נגד מפעלים מזהמים ועוד. אם מספיק אנשים יכתבו – גם הפעם ייווצר לחץ תקשורתי, שישפיע ויוביל לשינוי.
איך אפשר לעזור?
1. להצטרף התקשורת מאוד אוהבת סיפורים כאלה, ואם רבים יצטרפו במהירות, תהיה לכך השפעה גדולה. הנה הקבוצה ?את מי מייצג אופיר אקוניס
2. לשלוח מייל לח"כ אקוניס, לכתובת:
אפשר לשלוח פשוט קישור לרשימה הזו.
כדי שנוכל לפנות לתקשורת, ולציין ש"נשלחו X מיילים", אנא כתבו גם אותנו למייל – לכתובת
hon.shilton@ gmail.com
3. להפיץ את המסר.
Wednesday, October 20, 2010
The Coming Collapse of the Middle Class
Nothing of my own today - just a link to Professor Elizabeth Warren's fascinating lecture about bankruptcy. You have to hear this, even if the term 'bankruptcy law' makes you shudder.
(The actual lecture, after all the niceties, begins at min 6:20 or so)
Enjoy
(The actual lecture, after all the niceties, begins at min 6:20 or so)
Enjoy
Tuesday, September 28, 2010
Fighting Occupation with Oppression?
As an Israeli who believes in the right of Palestine to self-determination and the need to end Israeli occupation - what should I think about the way Palestinians are handling human rights and that's effect on the political struggle?
First, I want to put one thing aside - many people talk about human rights (especially and their implementation in the Muslim world) and actually mean Western concepts of human rights. Some of those who protest against the Muslim practice of women veiling themselves in public often fail to see that the Western concepts of women sexuality tend to be as objectifying and may be as oppressive towards those who suffer from them.
But even being aware of my (and everyone's) tendency of conflating what I know and what is proper, there's an inherit problem with supporting a national aspiration of a social-national group that does not believe in personal freedom.
Those who are familiar with political activism in Israel-Palestine have probably heard of Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in East Jerusalem. I've written a little about the legal/political situation that is the source of the legal and political disputes of ownership in that part of Jerusalem (here) but did not mention the weekly demonstrations taking place in the neighborhood. These demonstrations are organized by a joint Israeli-Palestinian private initiative, that involves left-wing Israelis (who are mostly secular Jews) and the local residents of the neighborhood (who are mainly religious Muslims). Lately, the organizers of these demonstrations have issued a request addressed at the Jewish women-protesters to show-up at the demonstrations only in clothes that would respect the local traditional population - no short trousers, no tank-tops (here, in Hebrew). Apparently, the Palestinian women who took part in the demonstrations did not feel comfortable being associated with women who are immodest according to the rules of their own culture. What's more of a problem, as it turns out, is that Muslim young men see such 'immodest' clothes as an invitation to sexual harassment of the Israeli participants in the struggle (here, in Hebrew, is an opening to the many blog entries about the subject).
By giving this example I'm trying to avoid the problem of conflating Western concepts with human rights concepts. This is not about Muslim society controlling the dress code within its borders, but a clear declaration across the board that even the women who do not adhere to Muslim values must follow Muslim modesty codes - not only when they visit East Jerusalem as tourists but when they are there on a mission of joining in with local population of fighting for what is just.
Can a women, a gay person, or any liberal person fight for a just national cause at the expense of her/his personal freedom? On one hand, those sensitive to oppression should be the first to fight it when it burdens others. On the other hand, the oppressed can be just as oppressing towards other, weaker populations. Demanding those women who do not believe in the need to cover their arms to do so when they arrive at East Jerusalem is an oppressive act merely because it enforces cultural practices on those who are not members of the relevant cultural group. It is, in a sense, a cultural occupation of the neighborhood, perhaps in response to the actual Israeli occupation. I do not claim that one is as bad as the other although, if the claim that Israeli protesters are being sexually harassed in demonstrations is true - we're getting pretty close. I'm willing to assume that not every occupation is the same and that, as some say, it is wise to finish fighting one before fighting the other. But as a supporter of liberty in all forms - what can be my excuse of ignoring one kind of oppression while I'm fighting the other?
First, I want to put one thing aside - many people talk about human rights (especially and their implementation in the Muslim world) and actually mean Western concepts of human rights. Some of those who protest against the Muslim practice of women veiling themselves in public often fail to see that the Western concepts of women sexuality tend to be as objectifying and may be as oppressive towards those who suffer from them.
But even being aware of my (and everyone's) tendency of conflating what I know and what is proper, there's an inherit problem with supporting a national aspiration of a social-national group that does not believe in personal freedom.
Those who are familiar with political activism in Israel-Palestine have probably heard of Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in East Jerusalem. I've written a little about the legal/political situation that is the source of the legal and political disputes of ownership in that part of Jerusalem (here) but did not mention the weekly demonstrations taking place in the neighborhood. These demonstrations are organized by a joint Israeli-Palestinian private initiative, that involves left-wing Israelis (who are mostly secular Jews) and the local residents of the neighborhood (who are mainly religious Muslims). Lately, the organizers of these demonstrations have issued a request addressed at the Jewish women-protesters to show-up at the demonstrations only in clothes that would respect the local traditional population - no short trousers, no tank-tops (here, in Hebrew). Apparently, the Palestinian women who took part in the demonstrations did not feel comfortable being associated with women who are immodest according to the rules of their own culture. What's more of a problem, as it turns out, is that Muslim young men see such 'immodest' clothes as an invitation to sexual harassment of the Israeli participants in the struggle (here, in Hebrew, is an opening to the many blog entries about the subject).
By giving this example I'm trying to avoid the problem of conflating Western concepts with human rights concepts. This is not about Muslim society controlling the dress code within its borders, but a clear declaration across the board that even the women who do not adhere to Muslim values must follow Muslim modesty codes - not only when they visit East Jerusalem as tourists but when they are there on a mission of joining in with local population of fighting for what is just.
Can a women, a gay person, or any liberal person fight for a just national cause at the expense of her/his personal freedom? On one hand, those sensitive to oppression should be the first to fight it when it burdens others. On the other hand, the oppressed can be just as oppressing towards other, weaker populations. Demanding those women who do not believe in the need to cover their arms to do so when they arrive at East Jerusalem is an oppressive act merely because it enforces cultural practices on those who are not members of the relevant cultural group. It is, in a sense, a cultural occupation of the neighborhood, perhaps in response to the actual Israeli occupation. I do not claim that one is as bad as the other although, if the claim that Israeli protesters are being sexually harassed in demonstrations is true - we're getting pretty close. I'm willing to assume that not every occupation is the same and that, as some say, it is wise to finish fighting one before fighting the other. But as a supporter of liberty in all forms - what can be my excuse of ignoring one kind of oppression while I'm fighting the other?
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