As an Israeli who believes in the right of Palestine to self-determination and the need to end Israeli occupation - what should I think about the way Palestinians are handling human rights and that's effect on the political struggle?
First, I want to put one thing aside - many people talk about human rights (especially and their implementation in the Muslim world) and actually mean Western concepts of human rights. Some of those who protest against the Muslim practice of women veiling themselves in public often fail to see that the Western concepts of women sexuality tend to be as objectifying and may be as oppressive towards those who suffer from them.
But even being aware of my (and everyone's) tendency of conflating what I know and what is proper, there's an inherit problem with supporting a national aspiration of a social-national group that does not believe in personal freedom.
Those who are familiar with political activism in Israel-Palestine have probably heard of Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in East Jerusalem. I've written a little about the legal/political situation that is the source of the legal and political disputes of ownership in that part of Jerusalem (here) but did not mention the weekly demonstrations taking place in the neighborhood. These demonstrations are organized by a joint Israeli-Palestinian private initiative, that involves left-wing Israelis (who are mostly secular Jews) and the local residents of the neighborhood (who are mainly religious Muslims). Lately, the organizers of these demonstrations have issued a request addressed at the Jewish women-protesters to show-up at the demonstrations only in clothes that would respect the local traditional population - no short trousers, no tank-tops (here, in Hebrew). Apparently, the Palestinian women who took part in the demonstrations did not feel comfortable being associated with women who are immodest according to the rules of their own culture. What's more of a problem, as it turns out, is that Muslim young men see such 'immodest' clothes as an invitation to sexual harassment of the Israeli participants in the struggle (here, in Hebrew, is an opening to the many blog entries about the subject).
By giving this example I'm trying to avoid the problem of conflating Western concepts with human rights concepts. This is not about Muslim society controlling the dress code within its borders, but a clear declaration across the board that even the women who do not adhere to Muslim values must follow Muslim modesty codes - not only when they visit East Jerusalem as tourists but when they are there on a mission of joining in with local population of fighting for what is just.
Can a women, a gay person, or any liberal person fight for a just national cause at the expense of her/his personal freedom? On one hand, those sensitive to oppression should be the first to fight it when it burdens others. On the other hand, the oppressed can be just as oppressing towards other, weaker populations. Demanding those women who do not believe in the need to cover their arms to do so when they arrive at East Jerusalem is an oppressive act merely because it enforces cultural practices on those who are not members of the relevant cultural group. It is, in a sense, a cultural occupation of the neighborhood, perhaps in response to the actual Israeli occupation. I do not claim that one is as bad as the other although, if the claim that Israeli protesters are being sexually harassed in demonstrations is true - we're getting pretty close. I'm willing to assume that not every occupation is the same and that, as some say, it is wise to finish fighting one before fighting the other. But as a supporter of liberty in all forms - what can be my excuse of ignoring one kind of oppression while I'm fighting the other?
Showing posts with label Israel. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Israel. Show all posts
Tuesday, September 28, 2010
Wednesday, April 14, 2010
Land, Ownership, and Luck
I think I never fully understood why land property was always dealt with differently from other kinds of property. Of course, buying houses and such is always more expensive than buying many other things, but still... to actually have a different set of laws to deal with those things?
I think that, in a way, the latest concerns about Arab and Jewish settlement and demolition plans in Jerusalem make me understand that difference a bit better.
East Jerusalem has been subject to four different legal regimes in the past century. First Ottoman, then British, later Jordanian (in 1948) and lastly Israeli (as a result of the 1967 war). In '48, the Jewish population of East Jerusalem fled to the western side of the city. In '67, the Arab population did the same, fleeing to other Arab cities in the West Bank and neighboring states. While those people could, generally speaking, take most of their belongings with them one thing always stayed behind - real estate. That's the one thing no one can carry with them. So, when everything you own usually goes with you and is subject to the same legal regime you are subject to - that's categorically not the case with the land that you own.
In the specific case of Jerusalem, both Jordan and Israel have laws that nationalize deserted land. When Jews left their land behind in 1948, Jordan nationalized them and gave them to Palestinian new residents. After the 1967 war, when Israel took over East Jerusalem it applied an exactly similar law on the property that was now deserted and, recently, gave back the property nationalized by Jordan to its original Jewish owners.
I'm sure this isn't how real estate law developed, or their historic justification. But this makes it clear to what extent owning land is different from owning other kinds of property. Ownership is a result of legal schemes. Look at the same house through the eyes of one legal system - it belongs to one person. Look at it through the eyes of another - it belongs to someone else. Unlike other movable property, the owner of land has so little control on what's happening to his or her property, cannot protect it, and cannot take it with them. Most of the time, we don't realize it. Most places are subject just to one legal regime - not only at one time but even through (at least recent) history. Only in certain cases, some unfortunate people see behind this veil of state-law connection. Some property has the bad luck of being in those place where one legal system chases another. In those cases remain the same, and so do the houses, but not the links tying them together.
I think that, in a way, the latest concerns about Arab and Jewish settlement and demolition plans in Jerusalem make me understand that difference a bit better.
East Jerusalem has been subject to four different legal regimes in the past century. First Ottoman, then British, later Jordanian (in 1948) and lastly Israeli (as a result of the 1967 war). In '48, the Jewish population of East Jerusalem fled to the western side of the city. In '67, the Arab population did the same, fleeing to other Arab cities in the West Bank and neighboring states. While those people could, generally speaking, take most of their belongings with them one thing always stayed behind - real estate. That's the one thing no one can carry with them. So, when everything you own usually goes with you and is subject to the same legal regime you are subject to - that's categorically not the case with the land that you own.
In the specific case of Jerusalem, both Jordan and Israel have laws that nationalize deserted land. When Jews left their land behind in 1948, Jordan nationalized them and gave them to Palestinian new residents. After the 1967 war, when Israel took over East Jerusalem it applied an exactly similar law on the property that was now deserted and, recently, gave back the property nationalized by Jordan to its original Jewish owners.
I'm sure this isn't how real estate law developed, or their historic justification. But this makes it clear to what extent owning land is different from owning other kinds of property. Ownership is a result of legal schemes. Look at the same house through the eyes of one legal system - it belongs to one person. Look at it through the eyes of another - it belongs to someone else. Unlike other movable property, the owner of land has so little control on what's happening to his or her property, cannot protect it, and cannot take it with them. Most of the time, we don't realize it. Most places are subject just to one legal regime - not only at one time but even through (at least recent) history. Only in certain cases, some unfortunate people see behind this veil of state-law connection. Some property has the bad luck of being in those place where one legal system chases another. In those cases remain the same, and so do the houses, but not the links tying them together.
Saturday, April 10, 2010
Muzzle the Watchdog
In the past few weeks the Israeli media has filled with obscure hints to the fact that something is going on. It wasn't clear what exactly that thing is, but if you knew how to read between the lines it was clear that something important has happened and that there's a gag order on it. Soon after, those bloggers who always know what's going on started letting out the details - a certain journalist was arrested in connection to some leak of army secrets. A few more weeks passed and the case was published in international media. After that, the gag order was lifted and most of the story exploded in Israeli media as well.
Gag orders are given by courts all around the world, all the time. What was so special about this one is that it involved journalists (which made it interesting for other journalists to talk about), and that the acts it referred to are illegal-but-maybe-moral (depending on your perspective, I guess). Either way, because it was easy to see how the story unfolded, there are two things to be said about it:
1. If 10 years ago a gag order would have prevented flow of information, it seems that now what it does is direct the flow of information in a way that gives room to unofficial and independent sources. Rather than looking at the leading newspapers (which are usually the main sources of information for most), people looked for information in blogs, indi-media websites, and social networks. Those website, that usually target only a very small audience, suddenly got a place on front stage. A cynic would say that in this sense, gag orders are actually the most democratic tool of the government to control the media. Thank god I'm not a cynic.
2. The specific gag order, as given by the magistrates court, did not only suppress the details of the affair, but also the fact that there is a gag order in effect. Official media could not even mention the fact that they are stopped from reporting something. It seems that this is the most outrageous part about the whole thing, since this part of the gag order does not even allow the public to evaluate the way media is treated by the authorities. Sometimes, there could be good reasons to muzzle the watchdog. But putting it to sleep without telling the owner is hardly justifiable.
Gag orders are given by courts all around the world, all the time. What was so special about this one is that it involved journalists (which made it interesting for other journalists to talk about), and that the acts it referred to are illegal-but-maybe-moral (depending on your perspective, I guess). Either way, because it was easy to see how the story unfolded, there are two things to be said about it:
1. If 10 years ago a gag order would have prevented flow of information, it seems that now what it does is direct the flow of information in a way that gives room to unofficial and independent sources. Rather than looking at the leading newspapers (which are usually the main sources of information for most), people looked for information in blogs, indi-media websites, and social networks. Those website, that usually target only a very small audience, suddenly got a place on front stage. A cynic would say that in this sense, gag orders are actually the most democratic tool of the government to control the media. Thank god I'm not a cynic.
2. The specific gag order, as given by the magistrates court, did not only suppress the details of the affair, but also the fact that there is a gag order in effect. Official media could not even mention the fact that they are stopped from reporting something. It seems that this is the most outrageous part about the whole thing, since this part of the gag order does not even allow the public to evaluate the way media is treated by the authorities. Sometimes, there could be good reasons to muzzle the watchdog. But putting it to sleep without telling the owner is hardly justifiable.
Friday, November 20, 2009
The Rock It Cannot Lift
In his book, "The Concept of Law", H.L.A. Hart asks if a legislative body can bind itself and its successors by transferring legislative powers over specific issues to a new and different body:
"[I]t might be conceded that Parliament might irrevocably alter the present constitution of Parliament by abolishing the House of Lords altogether... It might also be concede, as Dicey says, that Parliament could destroy itself totally, by an Act declaring its powers at an end and repealing the legislation providing for the election of future Parliaments. If so, Parliament might validly accompany this legislative suicide by an Act transferring all its powers to some other body, say the Manchester Corporation. If it can do this, cannot it effectually do something less? Can it not put an end to its powers to legislate on certain matters and transfer these to a new composite entity which includes itself and some further body?... It is quite possible that some of the questionable propositions... will one day be endorsed or rejected by a court called on to decide the matter." (pp. 151-152)
Yesterday, the Supreme Court of Israel decided on a strikingly similar matter. In a case questioning the constitutionality of an amendment to the law that made it possible for the state to privatize its prisons, the Court ruled such transfer of authority to be unconstitutional. The State, according to the Supreme Court, not only has the right to use hold a person prisoner if he or she committed a crime, it also has the duty to execute that right by itself and not delegate it to others. In what is pretty much an international precedent, the Court ruled that, with regards to certain issues, the government is incapable of stripping itself of its powers and transfer them to others, since no other body but the state itself is capable of balancing the proper interests of state and the individual.
It's easy to think of this ruling as dealing with human rights of prisoners, as even some of the Justices do. But I think the real question that was answered here is not 'what are the prisoner's rights?', but, rather, 'what is a state?'. So far, constitutions restricted governments only in what they are allowed to take or deprive their citizens. This, however, is an unprecedented decision about what the government must provide. While constitutional law was thus far focused on keeping governments small, this decision is focused on making sure the government won't grow too small. The truth is, that - as Justice Levi writes in his dissenting opinion - conditions in state prisons are sometimes so bad that prisoners might be better of in private hands. Nonetheless, the court decided that the government simply doesn't have the power to give away some of its powers to others.
Much like in the question whether an almighty god can create a rock he himself cannot lift, the Israeli Supreme Court was faced with the question which kinds of rocks can the parliament create. Yesterday it decided that there's a new kind of rocks that are has to be left on the ground.
Here is the Court's ruling (Hebrew) and a brief report (Hebrew and English).
"[I]t might be conceded that Parliament might irrevocably alter the present constitution of Parliament by abolishing the House of Lords altogether... It might also be concede, as Dicey says, that Parliament could destroy itself totally, by an Act declaring its powers at an end and repealing the legislation providing for the election of future Parliaments. If so, Parliament might validly accompany this legislative suicide by an Act transferring all its powers to some other body, say the Manchester Corporation. If it can do this, cannot it effectually do something less? Can it not put an end to its powers to legislate on certain matters and transfer these to a new composite entity which includes itself and some further body?... It is quite possible that some of the questionable propositions... will one day be endorsed or rejected by a court called on to decide the matter." (pp. 151-152)
Yesterday, the Supreme Court of Israel decided on a strikingly similar matter. In a case questioning the constitutionality of an amendment to the law that made it possible for the state to privatize its prisons, the Court ruled such transfer of authority to be unconstitutional. The State, according to the Supreme Court, not only has the right to use hold a person prisoner if he or she committed a crime, it also has the duty to execute that right by itself and not delegate it to others. In what is pretty much an international precedent, the Court ruled that, with regards to certain issues, the government is incapable of stripping itself of its powers and transfer them to others, since no other body but the state itself is capable of balancing the proper interests of state and the individual.
It's easy to think of this ruling as dealing with human rights of prisoners, as even some of the Justices do. But I think the real question that was answered here is not 'what are the prisoner's rights?', but, rather, 'what is a state?'. So far, constitutions restricted governments only in what they are allowed to take or deprive their citizens. This, however, is an unprecedented decision about what the government must provide. While constitutional law was thus far focused on keeping governments small, this decision is focused on making sure the government won't grow too small. The truth is, that - as Justice Levi writes in his dissenting opinion - conditions in state prisons are sometimes so bad that prisoners might be better of in private hands. Nonetheless, the court decided that the government simply doesn't have the power to give away some of its powers to others.
Much like in the question whether an almighty god can create a rock he himself cannot lift, the Israeli Supreme Court was faced with the question which kinds of rocks can the parliament create. Yesterday it decided that there's a new kind of rocks that are has to be left on the ground.
Here is the Court's ruling (Hebrew) and a brief report (Hebrew and English).
Wednesday, September 16, 2009
On Facebook and Issues of Nationality
If you have a Facebook account (of course you do, who doesn't?) then you must know that in order to set up your account you must choose which social networks you are interested in joining. Now, the primary network anyone usually connects herself to is a regional network, and that is usually the city, the state, or the country one lives in. This has an effect on the profiles you gain access to, and those who gain access to your profile (usually, most profiles are set to allow viewing only by other people of the same network).
Interestingly, one can only be a member of one regional network at any given time. That means that I, as an Israeli student abroad, must affiliate myself either as in Israeli or as a New Yorker. For Facebook, I can't be both, but have to renounce one identity in order to adopt the other. You might say that I am an exception to the rule, and that most people live in one place, and have no need in access and affiliation with any social networks on the other side of the world. I'm sure that's less and less true with each year, but anyway, that's only half the point.
The other half is that some areas of the world simply don't follow the rule of such simple social/national connection. For example: Israel (surprise surprise). Lately, it appeared in the news that Facebook changed its regions database so that Israeli settlers in the West Bank would be able to list themselves as members of the Israeli social network, although they live outside the official borders of the state of Israel. In addition, Alquds Alarabi published a report today, stating that Syria will launch a campaign demanding a boycott of Facebook because it permits Israelis living on the Golan Heights to list themselves as Israelis (and here it is in English). And I can only guess that the same problems arise (in different magnitude, perhaps) in other areas of the world such as Tibet, Northern Ireland, or Quebec.
The thing is, that Facebook's networks are not about defining political borders and group nationalities. They are about an individual's social group - the individual who owns the account. When dealing with such an individual's nationality, applying geographical concepts starts to seem a little ridiculous. I mean, in the "real" world of facts of buildings and roads and electricity services, a city or a region can be a part of only one state, although sometimes which state that region is a part of is debatable. A person, however, can identify as belonging to more than one regional group. An ex-patriot would want to be a part of regional networks of both the the place he comes from and the place he is in now. Quite similarly, people living in places currently in political dispute would usually identify themselves one way or the other. It makes no sense to force the Golan Heights' Israeli citizens to belong to the Syrian social network, as they have nothing to look for there; their entire social connections lie within the state of Israel. At the same time, it seems important to allow the Druze population to identify as Syrian, according to their true identity, and following their actual lingual and cultural social connections.
So here's my point: in today's world social networking has less and less to do with geo-political borders. One might live on one side of the world and affiliate with a social group defined by its location on the other side. Two people living in the same region might have no social connections, identifying themselves as members of completely different (and sometimes conflicting) nationalities. This is why I find it funny that Facebook - a website that is (1) designated for social purposes and (2) has no existence outside the web - seems to cling so strongly to the "one person, one regional affiliation" conception. Seriously, don't the people in Facebook know that the internet knows no borders?
(For some more reading: the digital methods initiative)
Interestingly, one can only be a member of one regional network at any given time. That means that I, as an Israeli student abroad, must affiliate myself either as in Israeli or as a New Yorker. For Facebook, I can't be both, but have to renounce one identity in order to adopt the other. You might say that I am an exception to the rule, and that most people live in one place, and have no need in access and affiliation with any social networks on the other side of the world. I'm sure that's less and less true with each year, but anyway, that's only half the point.
The other half is that some areas of the world simply don't follow the rule of such simple social/national connection. For example: Israel (surprise surprise). Lately, it appeared in the news that Facebook changed its regions database so that Israeli settlers in the West Bank would be able to list themselves as members of the Israeli social network, although they live outside the official borders of the state of Israel. In addition, Alquds Alarabi published a report today, stating that Syria will launch a campaign demanding a boycott of Facebook because it permits Israelis living on the Golan Heights to list themselves as Israelis (and here it is in English). And I can only guess that the same problems arise (in different magnitude, perhaps) in other areas of the world such as Tibet, Northern Ireland, or Quebec.
The thing is, that Facebook's networks are not about defining political borders and group nationalities. They are about an individual's social group - the individual who owns the account. When dealing with such an individual's nationality, applying geographical concepts starts to seem a little ridiculous. I mean, in the "real" world of facts of buildings and roads and electricity services, a city or a region can be a part of only one state, although sometimes which state that region is a part of is debatable. A person, however, can identify as belonging to more than one regional group. An ex-patriot would want to be a part of regional networks of both the the place he comes from and the place he is in now. Quite similarly, people living in places currently in political dispute would usually identify themselves one way or the other. It makes no sense to force the Golan Heights' Israeli citizens to belong to the Syrian social network, as they have nothing to look for there; their entire social connections lie within the state of Israel. At the same time, it seems important to allow the Druze population to identify as Syrian, according to their true identity, and following their actual lingual and cultural social connections.
So here's my point: in today's world social networking has less and less to do with geo-political borders. One might live on one side of the world and affiliate with a social group defined by its location on the other side. Two people living in the same region might have no social connections, identifying themselves as members of completely different (and sometimes conflicting) nationalities. This is why I find it funny that Facebook - a website that is (1) designated for social purposes and (2) has no existence outside the web - seems to cling so strongly to the "one person, one regional affiliation" conception. Seriously, don't the people in Facebook know that the internet knows no borders?
(For some more reading: the digital methods initiative)
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