Suddenly, every news website in Israel is reporting PM Netanyahu's press release, criticizing a UNESCO decision allegedly claiming that Rachel's Tomb and the Tomb of the Patriarchs are mosques that have no part in Jewish heritage (The initial citing of the decision appeared in Israel Hayom. Netanyahu's press release is a headline in Haaretz and ynet, if to link just two.) According to the press release "[t]he attempt to detach the people of Israel from its heritage is absurd. If the places where the fathers and mothers of the Jewish nation are buried, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Sarah, Leah and Rachel some 4,000 years ago are not part of the Jewish heritage then what is?"
Of course, a reading of the UNESCO decision itself reveals that it only reaffirms the fact that the two sites "are an integral part of the occupied Palestinian Territories" (here is the full decision). There's nothing there about Muslim or Jewish heritage (not with regards to those two sites, anyway). Just a statement that they are both located in one region and not in another - a simple statement that the Tomb of the Patriarch and Rachel's Tomb are in the West Bank, not in Israel.
But, hey, when everyone involved in this conflict has every interest of making it more religious than it is - who cares about the facts if there's a chance to gain some inflammatory PR instead?
Friday, October 29, 2010
Wednesday, October 27, 2010
Trafic Statistics and Inernational Law
Last weekend a few newspapers in Israel published articles about the notorious Route 443, citing IDF sources who claim that, since the route was reopened to the use of Palestinian cars, in accordance with the Israeli Supreme Court decision, only five Palestinian cars, in average, use it each day (Haaretz in Hebrew, JPost in English). According to the item, sources in the IDF feel frustrated with the fact that 60 million NIS were invested in following the Supreme Court's ruling, mainly in fitting security measures to the mixed use of the route, and they doubt that such an expense was worth the result.
I have to say that, at first, I was pretty surprised by the fact that army officials dare challenging a Supreme Court decision, let alone for its financial cost. The item, that appeared simultaneously in too many media sources to be a reporter's initiative, suggest an IDF criticism directed at the Court for not putting the right price tag on the freedom of movement, or on the free movement itself.
But, putting aside the troubling notion of an army that claims to know better than to Supreme Court how to balance human rights, isn't there a point to the IDF's claims about balancing expenses with results? 60 million NIS is not a small amount, and proportionality has always been a factor in international and constitutional law. Could it be that the Court really should have not issued a decision that forced the government to spend so much in order to protect so few?
I think that the answer is clearly no, for two reasons. First, the fact that only five Palestinians are using Route 443 every day is due, more than anything else, to the restrictions the IDF is imposing on them while trying to get on and off that road, in the form of checkpoints and blockades. If the IDF itself is the force that is preventing more common use of the road, it simply cannot claim that little use is why the Supreme Court's decision is flawed. Moreover, since the main legal justification of the land appropriations involved in making Route 443 into a highway in the first place was its benefit to local Palestinian population, it seems that alongside the IDF's duty to protect Israeli cars on the road it is also obligated to make it usable to Palestinian cars.
Second, not every financial consideration can be relevant when debating human rights. Although balancing expenses with results should always be a consideration in putting legal obligations on governments, it's clear that not every financial expense should influence the courts' deliberations. For instance, when a court needs to decide whether a government has a duty to provide a free service to its citizens (e.g. free education, free access to water, free health care) it's relevant to consider how much such a service would cost to the government (and tax payers) before reaching a decision. The courts should definitely acknowledge the limited resources available for allocation by their orders, and not impose a financial obligation that they find unreasonable. But these financial, utilitarian considerations can only be taken into account when they are intrinsic to the right involved, so much that it is the actual right itself. The right to free education, for instance, is the government's duty to provide educational services free of charge. Since education costs money, the right to free education is, in fact, the government's duty to pay for its citizen's education. Whether or not such a right exists should depend, to an extent, on how much that duty would cost.
Freedom of movement, however, is different. The duty it imposes on the government is the duty to refrain from blocking a citizen or resident's movement. This duty is not expensive. The 60 million put into allowing Palestinians free travel on Route 443 did not pay for the governments efforts in refraining from blocking the road. Rather, it was put into balancing the free movement - the right that the Supreme Court found to be illegally infringed - with other important interests, such as security and protection of others (let alone illegitimate interests of Israeli settlement). In fact, rather than enabling free movement, the amounts spent by the IDF were put into security measures that restrict that right. Without even going into whether these restrictions are legitimate or not - they are clearly not intrinsic to the freedom of movement itself. The cost, then, is not the right the Supreme Court ruled on. Therefore, it cannot be a relevant consideration in deliberating the protection of the right itself.
To put it in different words, if someone in the IDF thinks that 60 million NIS is what it costs to follow the Supreme Court's decision, it is up to the IDF to reconsider the measures it decided on. deciding on human rights should be left to the court.
I have to say that, at first, I was pretty surprised by the fact that army officials dare challenging a Supreme Court decision, let alone for its financial cost. The item, that appeared simultaneously in too many media sources to be a reporter's initiative, suggest an IDF criticism directed at the Court for not putting the right price tag on the freedom of movement, or on the free movement itself.
But, putting aside the troubling notion of an army that claims to know better than to Supreme Court how to balance human rights, isn't there a point to the IDF's claims about balancing expenses with results? 60 million NIS is not a small amount, and proportionality has always been a factor in international and constitutional law. Could it be that the Court really should have not issued a decision that forced the government to spend so much in order to protect so few?
I think that the answer is clearly no, for two reasons. First, the fact that only five Palestinians are using Route 443 every day is due, more than anything else, to the restrictions the IDF is imposing on them while trying to get on and off that road, in the form of checkpoints and blockades. If the IDF itself is the force that is preventing more common use of the road, it simply cannot claim that little use is why the Supreme Court's decision is flawed. Moreover, since the main legal justification of the land appropriations involved in making Route 443 into a highway in the first place was its benefit to local Palestinian population, it seems that alongside the IDF's duty to protect Israeli cars on the road it is also obligated to make it usable to Palestinian cars.
Second, not every financial consideration can be relevant when debating human rights. Although balancing expenses with results should always be a consideration in putting legal obligations on governments, it's clear that not every financial expense should influence the courts' deliberations. For instance, when a court needs to decide whether a government has a duty to provide a free service to its citizens (e.g. free education, free access to water, free health care) it's relevant to consider how much such a service would cost to the government (and tax payers) before reaching a decision. The courts should definitely acknowledge the limited resources available for allocation by their orders, and not impose a financial obligation that they find unreasonable. But these financial, utilitarian considerations can only be taken into account when they are intrinsic to the right involved, so much that it is the actual right itself. The right to free education, for instance, is the government's duty to provide educational services free of charge. Since education costs money, the right to free education is, in fact, the government's duty to pay for its citizen's education. Whether or not such a right exists should depend, to an extent, on how much that duty would cost.
Freedom of movement, however, is different. The duty it imposes on the government is the duty to refrain from blocking a citizen or resident's movement. This duty is not expensive. The 60 million put into allowing Palestinians free travel on Route 443 did not pay for the governments efforts in refraining from blocking the road. Rather, it was put into balancing the free movement - the right that the Supreme Court found to be illegally infringed - with other important interests, such as security and protection of others (let alone illegitimate interests of Israeli settlement). In fact, rather than enabling free movement, the amounts spent by the IDF were put into security measures that restrict that right. Without even going into whether these restrictions are legitimate or not - they are clearly not intrinsic to the freedom of movement itself. The cost, then, is not the right the Supreme Court ruled on. Therefore, it cannot be a relevant consideration in deliberating the protection of the right itself.
To put it in different words, if someone in the IDF thinks that 60 million NIS is what it costs to follow the Supreme Court's decision, it is up to the IDF to reconsider the measures it decided on. deciding on human rights should be left to the court.
Sunday, October 24, 2010
Bloggers for taxing oil drilling in Israel
Appologies to all those who do not read Hebrew.
This is a short note by Ofnan in support of the just campaign to tax oil drilling in Israel. Please join us.
את מי מייצג אופיר אקוניס?
מכתב גלוי ליו"ר ועדת הכלכלה
לכבוד יו"ר ועדת הכלכלה, ח"כ אופיר אקוניס,
בדיון בכנסת על תמלוגי הגז אמרת שתומכי העלאת התמלוגים הם "ארגוני שמאל פונדמנטליטסיים", ושאם יועלו התמלוגים, ישראל תהפוך ל"כלכלה סובייטית שחונקת את המשק", ו"הנפגע העיקרי יהיה האזרח". ציינת גם "איאבק בנושא עד טיפת דמי האחרונה".
אבקש לשאול מספר שאלות:
1. על יוזמי הצעת החוק להעלאת התמלוגים נמנים הח"כים שאמה (ליכוד), אורבך (הבית היהודי), וקנין (ש"ס) ואלדד (האיחוד הלאומי). האם, לטענתך, עמיתך לסיעה, כרמל שאמה, וחבר הכנסת אלדד מהאיחוד הלאומי הם "אנשי שמאל פונדמנטליסטיים"?
2. בארה"ב, בבריטניה, בקנדה ובשאר מדינות המערב, חלקו של הציבור הרחב בהכנסות מהפקת גז גבוה ב-66% בממוצע מזה שבישראל. האם, להערכתו של יו"ר ועדת הכלכלה של הכנסת, ארה"ב ובריטניה הן "כלכלות סובייטיות שחונקות את המשק"?
3. התמלוגים בארץ כה נמוכים, עד שחלקה של נובל אנרג'י לבדה, שהיא רק אחת השותפות בקידוחי הגז, בהכנסות, גבוה מזה של אזרחי ישראל. המס שמשלמת נובל אנרג'י בישראל נמוך יותר מזה שהיא משלמת בכל מקום אחר בעולם. האם, לטעמך, "ציונות" פירושה "להיאבק עד טיפת הדם האחרונה" על כך, שמירב הההכנסות מאוצרות הטבע של ישראל יגיעו לכיסו של תאגיד זר, במקום אל אזרחי ישראל?
4. המדינה העלתה לאחרונה את נטל המס השולי על השכירים מהמעמד הבינוני-גבוה ל-58%. רבים משכירים אלה הם עובדי הייטק, שבניגוד לחברות האנרגיה, לא מנצלים אוצרות טבע ששייכים למדינה, אלא להפך – תורמים מכשרונם ומחריצותם לקדמה ולשגשוג במדינה. יתר על כן: בעוד שאין שום חשש, שתאגידי האנרגיה יעזבו לפתע את הקידוחים מיותמים, גם אם המס יעלה והן ירוויחו, נניח, "רק" 40 מיליארד דולר, במקום 50 מיליארד – והרי אלה הסכומים שבהם מדובר – עובדי ההייטק שבהם מדובר דווקא כן עלולים לעזוב את המדינה – ולמרבה הצער, רבים מהם אף עושים זאת.
האם זוהי השיטה שלך לדאוג ל"אזרח" – לאלץ עובדים מהמעמד הבינוני-גבוה, שגם כך נושאים כעת בעיקר נטל המיסוי במדינה, לשאת על גבם מעתה גם הטבות מס בשווי עשרות מיליארדי דולרים לתאגידים זרים?
5. המומחים המקצועיים שתומכים בהעלאת התמלוגים– וביניהם פרופ' ברק מדינה, ד"ר ברנדה שפר ופרופ' אדרעי – לא קיבלו שום תשלום עבור חוות דעתם.
מאידך, כל חוות הדעת שמתנגדות להעלאת התמלוגים נכתבו תמורת תשלום מחברות האנרגיה. בישיבה שאותה ניהלת נכחו 15 לוביסטים בתשלום של תאגידי האנרגיה, המתנגדות להעלאת התמלוגים. את חברת "דלק" מייצג עו"ד רם כספי, המוכר גם כאבי "שיטת השקשוקה".
מכאן עולה התהיה - האם הלוביסטים ופרקליטי ה"שקשוקה" הם ה"אזרח" שלו אתה דואג כל כך?
בכבוד רב,
בקשה מהקוראים
תזכורת: מאבקים שפעלו בדרכים דומות הביאו לשינוי תקנות הרעש של השר ארדן, להגשת כתבי אישום נגד מפעלים מזהמים ועוד. אם מספיק אנשים יכתבו – גם הפעם ייווצר לחץ תקשורתי, שישפיע ויוביל לשינוי.
איך אפשר לעזור?
1. להצטרף התקשורת מאוד אוהבת סיפורים כאלה, ואם רבים יצטרפו במהירות, תהיה לכך השפעה גדולה. הנה הקבוצה ?את מי מייצג אופיר אקוניס
2. לשלוח מייל לח"כ אקוניס, לכתובת:
אפשר לשלוח פשוט קישור לרשימה הזו.
כדי שנוכל לפנות לתקשורת, ולציין ש"נשלחו X מיילים", אנא כתבו גם אותנו למייל – לכתובת
hon.shilton@ gmail.com
3. להפיץ את המסר.
Wednesday, October 20, 2010
The Coming Collapse of the Middle Class
Nothing of my own today - just a link to Professor Elizabeth Warren's fascinating lecture about bankruptcy. You have to hear this, even if the term 'bankruptcy law' makes you shudder.
(The actual lecture, after all the niceties, begins at min 6:20 or so)
Enjoy
(The actual lecture, after all the niceties, begins at min 6:20 or so)
Enjoy
Tuesday, September 28, 2010
Fighting Occupation with Oppression?
As an Israeli who believes in the right of Palestine to self-determination and the need to end Israeli occupation - what should I think about the way Palestinians are handling human rights and that's effect on the political struggle?
First, I want to put one thing aside - many people talk about human rights (especially and their implementation in the Muslim world) and actually mean Western concepts of human rights. Some of those who protest against the Muslim practice of women veiling themselves in public often fail to see that the Western concepts of women sexuality tend to be as objectifying and may be as oppressive towards those who suffer from them.
But even being aware of my (and everyone's) tendency of conflating what I know and what is proper, there's an inherit problem with supporting a national aspiration of a social-national group that does not believe in personal freedom.
Those who are familiar with political activism in Israel-Palestine have probably heard of Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in East Jerusalem. I've written a little about the legal/political situation that is the source of the legal and political disputes of ownership in that part of Jerusalem (here) but did not mention the weekly demonstrations taking place in the neighborhood. These demonstrations are organized by a joint Israeli-Palestinian private initiative, that involves left-wing Israelis (who are mostly secular Jews) and the local residents of the neighborhood (who are mainly religious Muslims). Lately, the organizers of these demonstrations have issued a request addressed at the Jewish women-protesters to show-up at the demonstrations only in clothes that would respect the local traditional population - no short trousers, no tank-tops (here, in Hebrew). Apparently, the Palestinian women who took part in the demonstrations did not feel comfortable being associated with women who are immodest according to the rules of their own culture. What's more of a problem, as it turns out, is that Muslim young men see such 'immodest' clothes as an invitation to sexual harassment of the Israeli participants in the struggle (here, in Hebrew, is an opening to the many blog entries about the subject).
By giving this example I'm trying to avoid the problem of conflating Western concepts with human rights concepts. This is not about Muslim society controlling the dress code within its borders, but a clear declaration across the board that even the women who do not adhere to Muslim values must follow Muslim modesty codes - not only when they visit East Jerusalem as tourists but when they are there on a mission of joining in with local population of fighting for what is just.
Can a women, a gay person, or any liberal person fight for a just national cause at the expense of her/his personal freedom? On one hand, those sensitive to oppression should be the first to fight it when it burdens others. On the other hand, the oppressed can be just as oppressing towards other, weaker populations. Demanding those women who do not believe in the need to cover their arms to do so when they arrive at East Jerusalem is an oppressive act merely because it enforces cultural practices on those who are not members of the relevant cultural group. It is, in a sense, a cultural occupation of the neighborhood, perhaps in response to the actual Israeli occupation. I do not claim that one is as bad as the other although, if the claim that Israeli protesters are being sexually harassed in demonstrations is true - we're getting pretty close. I'm willing to assume that not every occupation is the same and that, as some say, it is wise to finish fighting one before fighting the other. But as a supporter of liberty in all forms - what can be my excuse of ignoring one kind of oppression while I'm fighting the other?
First, I want to put one thing aside - many people talk about human rights (especially and their implementation in the Muslim world) and actually mean Western concepts of human rights. Some of those who protest against the Muslim practice of women veiling themselves in public often fail to see that the Western concepts of women sexuality tend to be as objectifying and may be as oppressive towards those who suffer from them.
But even being aware of my (and everyone's) tendency of conflating what I know and what is proper, there's an inherit problem with supporting a national aspiration of a social-national group that does not believe in personal freedom.
Those who are familiar with political activism in Israel-Palestine have probably heard of Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in East Jerusalem. I've written a little about the legal/political situation that is the source of the legal and political disputes of ownership in that part of Jerusalem (here) but did not mention the weekly demonstrations taking place in the neighborhood. These demonstrations are organized by a joint Israeli-Palestinian private initiative, that involves left-wing Israelis (who are mostly secular Jews) and the local residents of the neighborhood (who are mainly religious Muslims). Lately, the organizers of these demonstrations have issued a request addressed at the Jewish women-protesters to show-up at the demonstrations only in clothes that would respect the local traditional population - no short trousers, no tank-tops (here, in Hebrew). Apparently, the Palestinian women who took part in the demonstrations did not feel comfortable being associated with women who are immodest according to the rules of their own culture. What's more of a problem, as it turns out, is that Muslim young men see such 'immodest' clothes as an invitation to sexual harassment of the Israeli participants in the struggle (here, in Hebrew, is an opening to the many blog entries about the subject).
By giving this example I'm trying to avoid the problem of conflating Western concepts with human rights concepts. This is not about Muslim society controlling the dress code within its borders, but a clear declaration across the board that even the women who do not adhere to Muslim values must follow Muslim modesty codes - not only when they visit East Jerusalem as tourists but when they are there on a mission of joining in with local population of fighting for what is just.
Can a women, a gay person, or any liberal person fight for a just national cause at the expense of her/his personal freedom? On one hand, those sensitive to oppression should be the first to fight it when it burdens others. On the other hand, the oppressed can be just as oppressing towards other, weaker populations. Demanding those women who do not believe in the need to cover their arms to do so when they arrive at East Jerusalem is an oppressive act merely because it enforces cultural practices on those who are not members of the relevant cultural group. It is, in a sense, a cultural occupation of the neighborhood, perhaps in response to the actual Israeli occupation. I do not claim that one is as bad as the other although, if the claim that Israeli protesters are being sexually harassed in demonstrations is true - we're getting pretty close. I'm willing to assume that not every occupation is the same and that, as some say, it is wise to finish fighting one before fighting the other. But as a supporter of liberty in all forms - what can be my excuse of ignoring one kind of oppression while I'm fighting the other?
Wednesday, September 22, 2010
Is Gay Equality Equal?
A few days ago the Israeli Supreme Court issued a decision that forces the Jerusalem Municipality to fund the Gay Rights March organized by the local glbt (gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transsexual) organization - the Jerusalem Open House (Ynet report here, the full decision in Hebrew as a pdf file here). This decision is great news, I think, for anyone who supports glbt rights and equality. However, when I read the decision I felt troubled by it. In pragraph 54 of the decision, Justice Amit mentions that "the Israeli law regarding the gay community and its members reflects the changes that the Israeli society had gone through over the years. The Israeli society believes that the law must be indifferent to sexual orientation..." (my translation). Then Justice Amit goes over important milestones in the history of the gay struggle for legal equality in Israel and concludes, in paragraph 55, that "there's no wonder that scholars described the 1990's as the 'gay decade'... it should be mentioned that Israel's approach towards its gay population is one of the ways in which it proves it is a democratic and liberal state, unlike all other near and far states in the Middle East..." (again my translation).
Without addressing the motives of Justice Amit to compare Israel to its neighbors where such a comparison is completely irrelevant, these comments made me feel like Justice Amit, writing for the court, doesn't see glbt equality as a matter necessitated by a basic principle of justice. Rather, it is an expression of a public opinion that should be praised for its liberalism and acceptance. It should be appreciated.
And if you think that this is only an Israeli thing - yesterday the U.S. Senate voted against a bill that would allow to repeal the 'don't ask don't tell' policy of the U.S. armed forces (here). What I found amazing is not that the bill was repealed but that the bill itself made the repeal of the policy dependent on the outcome of a poll conducted by the Pentagon to survey the opinions of soldiers and find out if the change of policy would not hurt troop morale.
Somehow, glbt equality seems to be perceived as different from women's equality or racial equality. There were always people against them - but I don't think that those supporting them felt like they are doing someone a favor or that such equality depends on public opinion or the willingness of the voters to accept such equality. Is equality something that everyone deserves or does equality depend on the current beliefs of the crowd? Cause if equality should only be given to those who the public sees as equal - doesn't that make equality redundant? I mean, equality is worth something only if the political institutions are forced to provide equal rights to those that the public desires to discriminate. Otherwise, is equality a protection against discrimination at all? Is it even a right?
Without addressing the motives of Justice Amit to compare Israel to its neighbors where such a comparison is completely irrelevant, these comments made me feel like Justice Amit, writing for the court, doesn't see glbt equality as a matter necessitated by a basic principle of justice. Rather, it is an expression of a public opinion that should be praised for its liberalism and acceptance. It should be appreciated.
And if you think that this is only an Israeli thing - yesterday the U.S. Senate voted against a bill that would allow to repeal the 'don't ask don't tell' policy of the U.S. armed forces (here). What I found amazing is not that the bill was repealed but that the bill itself made the repeal of the policy dependent on the outcome of a poll conducted by the Pentagon to survey the opinions of soldiers and find out if the change of policy would not hurt troop morale.
Somehow, glbt equality seems to be perceived as different from women's equality or racial equality. There were always people against them - but I don't think that those supporting them felt like they are doing someone a favor or that such equality depends on public opinion or the willingness of the voters to accept such equality. Is equality something that everyone deserves or does equality depend on the current beliefs of the crowd? Cause if equality should only be given to those who the public sees as equal - doesn't that make equality redundant? I mean, equality is worth something only if the political institutions are forced to provide equal rights to those that the public desires to discriminate. Otherwise, is equality a protection against discrimination at all? Is it even a right?
Wednesday, April 14, 2010
Land, Ownership, and Luck
I think I never fully understood why land property was always dealt with differently from other kinds of property. Of course, buying houses and such is always more expensive than buying many other things, but still... to actually have a different set of laws to deal with those things?
I think that, in a way, the latest concerns about Arab and Jewish settlement and demolition plans in Jerusalem make me understand that difference a bit better.
East Jerusalem has been subject to four different legal regimes in the past century. First Ottoman, then British, later Jordanian (in 1948) and lastly Israeli (as a result of the 1967 war). In '48, the Jewish population of East Jerusalem fled to the western side of the city. In '67, the Arab population did the same, fleeing to other Arab cities in the West Bank and neighboring states. While those people could, generally speaking, take most of their belongings with them one thing always stayed behind - real estate. That's the one thing no one can carry with them. So, when everything you own usually goes with you and is subject to the same legal regime you are subject to - that's categorically not the case with the land that you own.
In the specific case of Jerusalem, both Jordan and Israel have laws that nationalize deserted land. When Jews left their land behind in 1948, Jordan nationalized them and gave them to Palestinian new residents. After the 1967 war, when Israel took over East Jerusalem it applied an exactly similar law on the property that was now deserted and, recently, gave back the property nationalized by Jordan to its original Jewish owners.
I'm sure this isn't how real estate law developed, or their historic justification. But this makes it clear to what extent owning land is different from owning other kinds of property. Ownership is a result of legal schemes. Look at the same house through the eyes of one legal system - it belongs to one person. Look at it through the eyes of another - it belongs to someone else. Unlike other movable property, the owner of land has so little control on what's happening to his or her property, cannot protect it, and cannot take it with them. Most of the time, we don't realize it. Most places are subject just to one legal regime - not only at one time but even through (at least recent) history. Only in certain cases, some unfortunate people see behind this veil of state-law connection. Some property has the bad luck of being in those place where one legal system chases another. In those cases remain the same, and so do the houses, but not the links tying them together.
I think that, in a way, the latest concerns about Arab and Jewish settlement and demolition plans in Jerusalem make me understand that difference a bit better.
East Jerusalem has been subject to four different legal regimes in the past century. First Ottoman, then British, later Jordanian (in 1948) and lastly Israeli (as a result of the 1967 war). In '48, the Jewish population of East Jerusalem fled to the western side of the city. In '67, the Arab population did the same, fleeing to other Arab cities in the West Bank and neighboring states. While those people could, generally speaking, take most of their belongings with them one thing always stayed behind - real estate. That's the one thing no one can carry with them. So, when everything you own usually goes with you and is subject to the same legal regime you are subject to - that's categorically not the case with the land that you own.
In the specific case of Jerusalem, both Jordan and Israel have laws that nationalize deserted land. When Jews left their land behind in 1948, Jordan nationalized them and gave them to Palestinian new residents. After the 1967 war, when Israel took over East Jerusalem it applied an exactly similar law on the property that was now deserted and, recently, gave back the property nationalized by Jordan to its original Jewish owners.
I'm sure this isn't how real estate law developed, or their historic justification. But this makes it clear to what extent owning land is different from owning other kinds of property. Ownership is a result of legal schemes. Look at the same house through the eyes of one legal system - it belongs to one person. Look at it through the eyes of another - it belongs to someone else. Unlike other movable property, the owner of land has so little control on what's happening to his or her property, cannot protect it, and cannot take it with them. Most of the time, we don't realize it. Most places are subject just to one legal regime - not only at one time but even through (at least recent) history. Only in certain cases, some unfortunate people see behind this veil of state-law connection. Some property has the bad luck of being in those place where one legal system chases another. In those cases remain the same, and so do the houses, but not the links tying them together.
Saturday, April 10, 2010
Muzzle the Watchdog
In the past few weeks the Israeli media has filled with obscure hints to the fact that something is going on. It wasn't clear what exactly that thing is, but if you knew how to read between the lines it was clear that something important has happened and that there's a gag order on it. Soon after, those bloggers who always know what's going on started letting out the details - a certain journalist was arrested in connection to some leak of army secrets. A few more weeks passed and the case was published in international media. After that, the gag order was lifted and most of the story exploded in Israeli media as well.
Gag orders are given by courts all around the world, all the time. What was so special about this one is that it involved journalists (which made it interesting for other journalists to talk about), and that the acts it referred to are illegal-but-maybe-moral (depending on your perspective, I guess). Either way, because it was easy to see how the story unfolded, there are two things to be said about it:
1. If 10 years ago a gag order would have prevented flow of information, it seems that now what it does is direct the flow of information in a way that gives room to unofficial and independent sources. Rather than looking at the leading newspapers (which are usually the main sources of information for most), people looked for information in blogs, indi-media websites, and social networks. Those website, that usually target only a very small audience, suddenly got a place on front stage. A cynic would say that in this sense, gag orders are actually the most democratic tool of the government to control the media. Thank god I'm not a cynic.
2. The specific gag order, as given by the magistrates court, did not only suppress the details of the affair, but also the fact that there is a gag order in effect. Official media could not even mention the fact that they are stopped from reporting something. It seems that this is the most outrageous part about the whole thing, since this part of the gag order does not even allow the public to evaluate the way media is treated by the authorities. Sometimes, there could be good reasons to muzzle the watchdog. But putting it to sleep without telling the owner is hardly justifiable.
Gag orders are given by courts all around the world, all the time. What was so special about this one is that it involved journalists (which made it interesting for other journalists to talk about), and that the acts it referred to are illegal-but-maybe-moral (depending on your perspective, I guess). Either way, because it was easy to see how the story unfolded, there are two things to be said about it:
1. If 10 years ago a gag order would have prevented flow of information, it seems that now what it does is direct the flow of information in a way that gives room to unofficial and independent sources. Rather than looking at the leading newspapers (which are usually the main sources of information for most), people looked for information in blogs, indi-media websites, and social networks. Those website, that usually target only a very small audience, suddenly got a place on front stage. A cynic would say that in this sense, gag orders are actually the most democratic tool of the government to control the media. Thank god I'm not a cynic.
2. The specific gag order, as given by the magistrates court, did not only suppress the details of the affair, but also the fact that there is a gag order in effect. Official media could not even mention the fact that they are stopped from reporting something. It seems that this is the most outrageous part about the whole thing, since this part of the gag order does not even allow the public to evaluate the way media is treated by the authorities. Sometimes, there could be good reasons to muzzle the watchdog. But putting it to sleep without telling the owner is hardly justifiable.
Wednesday, January 20, 2010
Employees Must Wash Their Hands
If you've ever been to the bathroom in a restaurant or a bar in New York, you must have seen this sign. It's always there, saying "Employees must wash their hands before returning to work," or something of the sort.
I always wonder how effective that sign is. I mean, I'm sure there's some kind of legal duty (either a statute or a city ordinance) making it mandatory to have one of those signs in every toilet in every business that sells food. I wonder if that duty is just on the business owners to locate the sign in their bathroom, or if there's an actual legal duty on employees to wash their hands, and the owners just have to notify their employees of that duty.
I mean, how would anyone know if the employee actually washed her hands before returning to work? If it's one of those places where the sink is located in the same room with the toilet seat, it's all done behind locked doors and there's no way to tell. It's like a cat in a box with no openings. You have no idea what's going on inside.
They always teach you in law school that the law wouldn't create a duty it cannot enforce. They also teach you that there's a distinction between the public sphere (where duties and rights are regulated) and the private sphere (where one is free to do as she likes). But the duty set on employees to wash their hands after using the toilet is completely unenforceable, and is located in the most private sphere one could imagine. One little sign is defying everything I ever knew about law.
I always wonder how effective that sign is. I mean, I'm sure there's some kind of legal duty (either a statute or a city ordinance) making it mandatory to have one of those signs in every toilet in every business that sells food. I wonder if that duty is just on the business owners to locate the sign in their bathroom, or if there's an actual legal duty on employees to wash their hands, and the owners just have to notify their employees of that duty.
I mean, how would anyone know if the employee actually washed her hands before returning to work? If it's one of those places where the sink is located in the same room with the toilet seat, it's all done behind locked doors and there's no way to tell. It's like a cat in a box with no openings. You have no idea what's going on inside.
They always teach you in law school that the law wouldn't create a duty it cannot enforce. They also teach you that there's a distinction between the public sphere (where duties and rights are regulated) and the private sphere (where one is free to do as she likes). But the duty set on employees to wash their hands after using the toilet is completely unenforceable, and is located in the most private sphere one could imagine. One little sign is defying everything I ever knew about law.
Thursday, January 14, 2010
Human Nature
Is it only me, or is it true that most professors (and students) in gender studies are either women or gay men? I never seriously surveyed every law school faculty, but my gut feeling tends to say that this really is the case.
In a way, it's kind of sad. We teach ourselves that the law is a social tool that promotes equality to all members of society. I think that a more proper definition is that the law is a social tool through which disenfranchised minorities are able to claim their own equality. Not that this is a bad thing. It's good to have a social field in which people can struggle for their rights without violence and with a pretty good chance of getting what they deserve. It's just a shame to find out that, still, people actively fight mostly for their own rights, and much less for the rights of others. They might vigorously support such a struggle, but not really engage in its promotion.
So next time you're born into a minority group, at least make sure you're born to a relatively large and educated one. Otherwise you might find that you're really screwed.
In a way, it's kind of sad. We teach ourselves that the law is a social tool that promotes equality to all members of society. I think that a more proper definition is that the law is a social tool through which disenfranchised minorities are able to claim their own equality. Not that this is a bad thing. It's good to have a social field in which people can struggle for their rights without violence and with a pretty good chance of getting what they deserve. It's just a shame to find out that, still, people actively fight mostly for their own rights, and much less for the rights of others. They might vigorously support such a struggle, but not really engage in its promotion.
So next time you're born into a minority group, at least make sure you're born to a relatively large and educated one. Otherwise you might find that you're really screwed.
Wednesday, January 13, 2010
Virtual Borders
I remember how in the 90's, when the internet just started to gain popularity, there was this new feeling in the air. Everyone felt like the world as we know it is going to change, and that borders and physical location are going to become meaningless. The Global Village, they called it. No matter where you are, anything and everything would be just a mouse-click away, since it's all going to be online.
For some time it really seemed like it's going in that direction. Information became accessible worldwide and international contacts became easy to maintain. Suddenly, instead of interacting with the people who lived near you, you could interact with people like you even if they were on the other side of the world.
But this giant leap seems to be slowing down now, if not taking a completely different direction. When information started flowing so easily across borders, it was clear that intellectual property (IP) rules would have to change. IP law can only be enforced where it applies and where there are means to enforce it. That means that if something (let's say, sharing media files) is illegal in Country A and legal in Country B, media that flows from Country A to Country B is lost to it's owners in Country A, in the sense that they can no longer earn money from their property in Country B. More importantly, even if sharing media files is illegal in Country B, if the media's owner is located in Country A, and Country B is on the other side of the world, it might be too expensive for the media's owner to sue in Country B, and useless for it to sue in Country A.
This problem in enforceability had to be resolved in some way, and such a way did come up. More and more online media is now free to use, while it is sponsored by commercials. So if media is free, there's less insentive for people to download illegally, and the media owner is making its profits of commercials. This model was adopted by many, such as Hulu, ABC.com, Fox.com, and Pandora, which all offer free media in return for the small burden of watching/listening to a commercial or two. I think that's great. In a sense, I find it to be the most social solution, since in a way it makes the rich sponsor the poor's needs.
The problem with this solution, however, is that it made free media accessible only where the sponsors have an interest in advertising. This is why Pandora, which used to be free to use world wide, is now accessible only with U.S. IP addresses. If you are located somewhere else in the world, you're blocked. No one's paying for your use of media, so you're out of the game. Most websites don't even allow these 'international' users to pay for their media. They are either forced to give up what they want, find the same thing off the internet (on CD's, DVD's and such), or download illegally. Even iTunes wouldn't sell for people outside the countries Apple feels comfortable engaging in electronic business in.
So only ten years after the big promise of the global village, the old order is slowly being restored, with the assistance of IP law and enforcement. The countries that produce the media are the countries that use it. Users who have the misfortune of living in countries who are traditionally buyers of international merchandise are forced into their old role as inactive, powerless, paying consumers. If this is the way we're headed, the 15 years or so in which the internet really had no boundaries would be just like the 60's free love - a sweet sweet dream.
For some time it really seemed like it's going in that direction. Information became accessible worldwide and international contacts became easy to maintain. Suddenly, instead of interacting with the people who lived near you, you could interact with people like you even if they were on the other side of the world.
But this giant leap seems to be slowing down now, if not taking a completely different direction. When information started flowing so easily across borders, it was clear that intellectual property (IP) rules would have to change. IP law can only be enforced where it applies and where there are means to enforce it. That means that if something (let's say, sharing media files) is illegal in Country A and legal in Country B, media that flows from Country A to Country B is lost to it's owners in Country A, in the sense that they can no longer earn money from their property in Country B. More importantly, even if sharing media files is illegal in Country B, if the media's owner is located in Country A, and Country B is on the other side of the world, it might be too expensive for the media's owner to sue in Country B, and useless for it to sue in Country A.
This problem in enforceability had to be resolved in some way, and such a way did come up. More and more online media is now free to use, while it is sponsored by commercials. So if media is free, there's less insentive for people to download illegally, and the media owner is making its profits of commercials. This model was adopted by many, such as Hulu, ABC.com, Fox.com, and Pandora, which all offer free media in return for the small burden of watching/listening to a commercial or two. I think that's great. In a sense, I find it to be the most social solution, since in a way it makes the rich sponsor the poor's needs.
The problem with this solution, however, is that it made free media accessible only where the sponsors have an interest in advertising. This is why Pandora, which used to be free to use world wide, is now accessible only with U.S. IP addresses. If you are located somewhere else in the world, you're blocked. No one's paying for your use of media, so you're out of the game. Most websites don't even allow these 'international' users to pay for their media. They are either forced to give up what they want, find the same thing off the internet (on CD's, DVD's and such), or download illegally. Even iTunes wouldn't sell for people outside the countries Apple feels comfortable engaging in electronic business in.
So only ten years after the big promise of the global village, the old order is slowly being restored, with the assistance of IP law and enforcement. The countries that produce the media are the countries that use it. Users who have the misfortune of living in countries who are traditionally buyers of international merchandise are forced into their old role as inactive, powerless, paying consumers. If this is the way we're headed, the 15 years or so in which the internet really had no boundaries would be just like the 60's free love - a sweet sweet dream.
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